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There is an elaborate debate over the practice of “discounting” regulatory benefits, such 
as environmental improvements and decreased risks to health and life, when those benefits will 
not be enjoyed until some future date. Economists tend to think that as a general rule, such 
benefits should be discounted in the same way as money; many philosophers and lawyers doubt 
that conclusion on empirical and normative grounds. The doubts have been countered with the 
suggestion that a failure to discount would lead to unreasonable or paradoxical results. Both 
sides frequently neglect a simple point: Once government has converted regulatory benefits into 
monetary equivalents, what is being discounted is merely money, not regulatory benefits as such. 
No one seeks to discount health and life – only the money that might be used to reduce threats to 
these goods. It is nonetheless true that cost-benefit analysis with discounting can create serious 
problems of intergenerational equity; those problems, involving the obligations of the present to 
the future, require an independent analysis.  A morally adequate response to the underlying 
problems, not involving the question of whether to discount, is to ensure that future generations 
receive compensation for any risks that are imposed on them by their predecessors.  
   1
On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity 
 




Suppose that a proposed regulation will not produce benefits for many years; suppose too 
that an agency is asked to engage in some form of cost-benefit analysis before it proceeds with 
the regulation. Costs will be discounted, on the theory that a dollar today is worth less than a 
dollar in twenty years. But what should the agency do about future benefits, such as improved 
health or averted deaths? Should these too be "discounted," or should a death in 2025 be treated 
the same as a death today?  
In terms of ultimate outcomes, the choice matters a great deal. If an agency chooses not 
to discount, the benefits calculation will shift dramatically from what it would be if the agency 
chose a discount rate of, for example, 10%. If a human life is valued at $8 million, and no 
discount rate is applied, a life saved 100 years from now is worth the same expenditure as a life 
saved now: $8 million.  But at a discount rate of 10%, the same life would justify a modern 
expenditure of only $581.
1 For regulation whose effects would be felt centuries from now, any 
reasonable discount rate will reduce apparently substantial benefits to close to nothing.
2 The 
Office of Management and Budget suggests that agencies should prepare analyses using rates of 
both 3% and 7%,
3 departing from its suggested 10% rate in the 1980s. But these numbers remain 
controversial.
4  Consider the fact that the midpoint figure – 5% -- would ensure that if a human 
life is valued at $8 million, one hundred deaths in one hundred years would be worth only $6.25 
million.  
In any case agencies are not bound by OMB guidelines, and in recent years, their own 
numbers have ranged from as low as 3% (Food and Drug Administration, Department of 
                                                 
1 See Michael Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation, 92 NW L Rev 706, 742-43 (1998). 
2 See Martin L. Weitzman, “Just Keeping Discounting, But . . .”, in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 23 
(Paul R. Portney and John P. Weyant eds, 1999). 
3 For the 7% rate, see OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53520 (1992); for a more 
recent suggestion that agencies use both 3% and 7%, see Circular A-4, 33-34 (September, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html 
4 See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U Chi L Rev 1345, 1373 (2003).   2
Housing and Urban Development) to as high as 10% (Environmental Protection Agency).
5 In 
fact the same agency sometimes endorses different discount rates for no apparent reason -- with 
EPA, for example, selecting 3% for regulation of lead-based paint, 7% for regulation of drinking 
water, and 10% for regulation of emissions from locomotives.
6 In this domain, government 
practice seems extremely erratic.  Key questions are therefore: Which discount rate, if any, 
should agencies choose?
7 Do life and health deserve some special discount rate – or no discount 
rate at all? What is the relationship between discount rates and the rights and interests of future 
generations? 
We shall attempt to make progress on these questions by offering two claims. First, 
regulatory benefits should generally be discounted at the same rate as money, and for a reason 
that is neglected by all sides: money is inevitably what is being discounted.
8 When regulators 
appear to “discount” mortality or morbidity, they are actually discounting people’s willingness to 
pay to reduce statistical risks; and willingness to pay figures should be discounted for risks as for 
all other expenditures. Second, it is correct to stress that cost-benefit analysis with discounting 
can produce serious problems of intergenerational equity. Decisions based on that form of 
analysis might well lead to morally unjustified actions by the present at the expense of posterity. 
But these problems are not properly handled by refusing to discount; any moral obligations 
should be satisfied instead by ensuring adequate compensation to future generations for the risks 
imposed on them. To understand these claims, and their implications for administrative agencies, 





                                                 
5 See Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
65 U Chi L Rev 1333 (1998). 
6 Id. at 1337. 
7 Valuable treatments include Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Col L Rev 941 (1999); Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in 
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333 (1998). 
8 We do not attempt to specify the appropriate monetary discount rate. For discussion, see Discounting and 
Intergenerational Equity (Paul R. Portney and John P. Weyant eds, 1999); Richard A Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and 
Response 150-55 (2004); Daniel Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, 
Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 267 (1993); William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of 
Discount, 58 Am Econ Rev 788 (1968).   3
2. Debates 
 
The issue of discounting is greatly disputed in both theory and practice. In an important 
case, a federal court said that discounting is necessary to provide an "apples to apples" 
comparison of costs and benefits, suggesting that agencies are legally required to use the same 
discount rate for health and safety benefits as for dollars.
9 Other decisions have insisted on 
careful explanations for whatever discount rates agencies choose.
10 Economists tend to believe 




13 are often skeptical abut discounting. Philosophers 
have raised serious doubts about the idea that a future death or illness should be discounted in the 
same way as money.
14 Lawyers as well have questioned that idea, suggesting that it depends on 
contentious empirical or normative assumptions.
15 
 
Objections and Paradoxes 
A central objection is that a life in 2025 is not obviously “worth less” than a life today. 
Thus one critic asks: “What is wrong with discounting numbers of lives saved? One obvious 
problem is that death does not recognize human accounting conventions and death does not 
discount.”
16 In the same vein, Ackerman and Heinzerling object that “the choice implicit in 
discounting is between preventing harms to the current generation and preventing similar harms 
to future generations. Seen in this way, discounting looks like a fancy justification for foisting 
                                                 
9 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
10 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v Herrington, 768 F2d 1355, 1410-14 (DC Cir 1985); Northern California 
Power Agency v FERC, 37 F3d 1517 (DC Cir 1994). 
11 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U Chi L Rev 1021, 
1026-27 (2004); John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount Discounting, 
108 Yale LJ 1901 (1998). Various positions are presented in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity (Paul R. 
Portney and John P. Weyant eds. 1999), with recognition of some of the underlying complexities. See the Paul R. 
Portney and John P. Weyant, Introduction, stressing in particular “the unease even the best minds of the profession 
feel about discounting, due to the technical complexity of the issues and to their ethical ramifications,” id at 5. 
12 Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age Groups and Generations 
144, 148 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 357 (1984). 
13 See Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a Pragmatic Approach 118-119 
(2003); Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless, 150 U Pa L Rev 1553, 1570-73 (2002); Frank 
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless (2004). 
14 See Cowen and Parfit, supra note. 
15 See Richard Revesz, supra note. 
16 Richard D. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U Chi L Rev 1345, 1374 (2003).   4
our problems off onto the people who come after us.”
17 They emphasize that with “a discount 
rate of five percent, for example, the death of a billion people 500 years from now becomes less 
serious than the death of one person today”
18 – an evidently implausible conclusion. 
Defenders of discounting have responded that a refusal to use a discount rate creates a 
number of logical and practical conundrums. Perhaps a refusal to discount would require truly 
extraordinary sacrifices from the present for the sake of the (infinite) future. On one view, the 
“failure to discount would leave all generations at a subsistence level of existence, because 
benefits would be postponed perpetually for the future.”
19 At the very least, a zero discount rate 
might be seen to bias “cost-benefit analysis in favor of rules that impose excessive sacrifices on 
the current generation.”
20 On the other hand, it has also been argued that a failure to discount the 
monetized equivalent of regulatory benefits would lead to less regulation, not more. The reason 
is that if regulators are indifferent as between lives saved now and lives saved in the future, but 
discount costs at some positive rate, then it makes sense for them to delay life-saving 
expenditures indefinitely, simply because the cost-benefit ratio will (always) be better in the 
future.
21 “[T]he discounting of costs but not benefits . . . has a paralyzing effect on a 
decisionmaker. . . . For any attractive program, there is always a superior delayed program which 
should be funded first. The result is that no program with a finite starting date can be selected.”
22  
In any case defenders of discounting have argued that instead of discounting lives as 
such, regulators might simply use the future discounted (monetary) cost of saving lives at the 
time when lives are saved – an approach that is mathematically identical and hence produces the 
same analysis.
23 Summarizing a range of arguments, a valuable overview suggests that failure to 
permit a discount rate will ensure that any cost-benefit “analysis fails to account for the 
opportunity cost of resources that are diverted from private investment toward investment in the 
proposed rule,” and could therefore “lead the agency to adopt rules that reduce the welfare of 
                                                 
17 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, supra note, at 1571. 
18 Id. 
19 See David Pearce and R. Kelly Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment 223-24 (1990). 
20 Id. 
21 Emmett B. Keeler and Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and Other Nonmonetary Effects, 29 Management 
Science 300 (1983). Ackerman and Heinzerling discuss this claim and reject it, Priceless, supra, at 193-94, in part on 
the ground that allowing numerous current deaths would be politically unacceptable; but the claim is one of the 
logical implication of refusing to discount, and the fact that it entails a politically unacceptable outcome does not 
mean that it is wrong.  
22 Keeler and Cretin, supra note, at 303. The argument is criticized in Revesz, supra note, at 989-992. 
23 John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. Risk and Uncertainty 221 (2003).     5
future generations, because the resources could have been invested in assets with higher rates of 
return.”
24 But for good reasons, these arguments have yet to convince the numerous critics of 
discounting. As we shall see, it is by no means clear that the relevant resources will be 
“invested” for the benefit of future generations. 
Responding to the controversy, some prominent analysts have distinguished between 
“descriptive” and “prescriptive” approaches.
25 Under descriptive approaches, the discount rate is 
chosen by examining the rate of return to capital that has been invested in a range of possible 
assets. This is the standard approach of those who advocate discounting.
26 Under prescriptive 
approaches, the discount rate is selected on the basis of ethical judgments, involving normative 
views about the duties of one generation to those that succeed it. These approaches can lead to 
dramatically different rates.
27 The problem is that to be worthy of serious consideration, any 
“descriptive” approach must be defended in “prescriptive” terms. It remains disputed whether the 
best prescriptive arguments require abandonment of what emerges from the preferred descriptive 
approach.  
 
Building on Preferences 
Perhaps the moral debates can be bracketed by investigating people’s actual preferences 
in this domain.
28 Emphasizing the importance of those preferences, some defenders of 
discounting have attempted to show that people do discount future lives. On a standard view, “a 
zero discount rate is inconsistent with the observable behavior of individuals, which is arguably 
the best guide for policy in a democratic state.”
29 The normative problem is the use of the word 
                                                 
24 Edward R. Morrison, Comment, supra note, at 1349. This argument has been used by OMB itself, see infra, and it 
is the closest to the argument made here; but if our argument is correct, it is unnecessary to speak of opportunity 
costs, because what is being discounted is the monetary value of the risk itself. For questions of intergenerational 
equity, the argument from opportunity costs is insufficient, because we do not know that those costs will be invested 
for posterity’s benefit rather than consumed. See Cowen and Parfit, supra note, at 152, Note that many people 
believe that because of technological advances, future risks are unlikely to come to fruition, simply because new 
technologies will permit us to prevent them. As later discussed in text, this is not, however, a point about 
discounting itself. 
25 See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in Climate Change 
1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change ch. 4 (J.P. Bruce et al. eds. 1996); William Cline, 
Discounting for the Very Long Term, in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, supra, at 131, 135, 137-39. 
26 See Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for Evaluating National Energy 
Options, in Robert C. Lind et al., Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy (1982). 
27 See Portney and Weyant, Introduction, Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, supra, at 4. 
28 See Raymond J. Kopp and Paul R. Portney, Mock  Referenda and Intergenerational Decisionmaking, in 
Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, supra, at 87. 
29 Id.   6
“arguably” in this context: Why should the interests of future generations be determined by 
consulting the preferences of the present generation? Those preferences might well be self-
interested. Even if there is a degree of altruism, there is no reason to think that the (bounded) 
altruism of the present should settle the moral entitlements of the future.
30  
In any case, individual preferences in this context are not easy to identify, and they 
appear to be labile. In an influential paper, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors conclude that 
people are indifferent between saving one life today and saving 45 lives in 100 years – a 
conclusion that has concrete implications for the appropriate discount rate.
31 But this finding is 
an artifact of a particular way of framing the problem. Cropper and her coauthors asked people 
whether they would prefer a program that saves “100 people now” or a one that saves a 
substantially larger number “100 years from now.” Other ways of framing the same problem 
yield radically different results.
32 For example, most people consider “equally bad” a single 
death from pollution next year and a single death from pollution in 100 years. This finding 
implies no preference for members of the current generation. People’s judgments about 
obligations to future generations are very much a product of framing effects
33 -- a fact that 
greatly undermines the suggestion that discounting can be based on actual preferences.   
 
Health vs. Money, Latent Harms vs. Future Generations 
Within the legal literature, the most influential and elaborate treatment has been offered 
by Dean Richard Revesz.
34 Revesz makes two central arguments. First, he contends that the 
primary reasons for discounting monetary benefits do not apply to risks to life and health.
35 
Money is discounted for two reasons: first, it can be invested and second, most people have a 
"pure" time preference for current over future consumption.
36 But human lives cannot be 
invested, and a life lost twenty years hence cannot be “recovered” by investing some sum, or 
                                                 
30 This objection raises serious questions about the approach in id. For a related criticism of democratic arguments 
for discounting, see Cowen and Parfit, supra note, at 144-45 (“When those affected have no vote, the appeal to 
democracy provides no answer.”). 
31 Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 J. 
Risk & Uncertainty 243, at 244, 254 (1993). 
32 Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future Lives Valued Less?, 26 J. Risk and 
Uncertainty 1 (2003). 
33 For a similar result, see Jonathan Baron, Can we use human judgments to determine the 
discount rate? 20 Risk Analysis 861 (2000). 
34 See Revesz, supra note. 
35 Id. at 974-77.   7
some person, in the present. Notwithstanding the absence of investment opportunities, Revesz 
acknowledges that people may well have a “pure” time preference that would treat a future risk 
as less troublesome than a present risk.
37 Moore and Viscusi, for example, have investigated the 
empirical question, and find a real discount rate of about 2%, one that "accords roughly with 
financial market interest rates for the period, once these nominal rates are adjusted for 
inflation."
38 Revesz argues that the existence of time preference justifies some discount rate for 
harms that will occur to people now living, but in the future.
39  
To see the practical implication, consider in the case of arsenic regulation. In its rationale 
for its regulation, the EPA treated an arsenic death in the future as equivalent to an arsenic death 
in the present, even though an arsenic death is likely to come, if it does come, decades after 
current exposures.
40 In refusing to discount the latent harms from arsensic exposure, Revesz’ 
argument suggests that the EPA’s judgment is wrong, even arbitrary; some kind of discount rate 
is clearly appropriate here. But Revesz argues, not implausibly, that there is no reason in the 
abstract to think that the time preference for health risks is the same as the time preference for 
dollars; and because there is no investment opportunity, any discount rate for health risks is 
likely to be much smaller than the market rate of return typically used to discount money. Hence 
the use of a market rate of return, on Revesz’s view, is likely to produce a significant 
undervaluation of regulatory benefits that will be enjoyed in the future.
41 This is an important 
conclusion, because it suggests that current government practice should be substantially changed, 
in a way that would justify a number of regulations that cannot now satisfy a cost-benefit test. 
Second, Revesz contends that it is important to distinguish between latent harms and risks 
to future generations.
42 An environmentally-induced illness today is worse than an 
environmentally-induced illness in twenty years; it is for this reason that some kind of discount 
rate makes a great deal of sense for latent harms. But for risks to future generations, Revesz 
believes that the argument for discounting is much more  
                                                                                                                                                             
36 For a suggestion that a pure time preference is irrational, see Cowen and Parfit, supra note, at 155. 
37 Revesz, supra note, at 975-76. 
38 Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New Evidence and Policy 
Implications, 18 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. S-59, S-61 (1990) 
39 Revesz, supra note, at 983-87. 
40 66 Fed Reg at 7013. 
41 Revesz, supra note, at 983. 
42 Id. at 987.   8
fragile.
43 Why should a death of a ten-year-old in 2040 count less than a death of a ten-year-old 
today? Revesz concludes that there is no good answer to this question, and hence that the 
standard idea of discounting is not properly applied to harms faced by members of future 
generations.
44 
In its guidance to federal agencies, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is alert 
to Revesz’ concerns but disagrees, calling for the same discount rate for money and for other 
goods with a brisk reference to opportunity costs: “It is true that lives saved today cannot be 
invested in a bank to save more lives in the future. But the resources that would have been used 
to save those lives can be invested to earn a higher payoff in future lives saved.”
45 In any case 
people prefer immediate health gains to equivalent health gains in the future.
46 And because a 
failure to discount would produce “perverse” results, OMB suggests that agencies should follow 
the “professional consensus that future health effects, including both benefits and costs, should 
be discounted at the same rate.”
47  
 
3. Discounting Money: The Last Generation 
 
We believe that both the defenders and the critics of discounting neglect an exceedingly 
simple point, one that supports the conclusion that an “apples to apples” comparison is indeed 
necessary, at least if the question of intergenerational equity is put to one side. The point is this: 
Once risk is monetized, it has been translated into money, and may be discounted as such. 
To separate this argument from intergenerational issues, to which we turn in Part IV, let 
us suppose that the practice of discounting is proposed, but only for those people who are now 
living. Imagine that the question involves the practices of what is, in some part of the world, the 
Last Generation – a generation of living people who will have no successors.
48 
                                                 
43 Id. at 988-1003. 
44 Id. at 1005-1009. Revesz does argue for a limited role for discounting in the intergenerational context, suggesting, 
for example, that present generations should not “spend more when we can achieve the same result for less,” id. at 
1008, and that present generations might well prefer to face environmental harms in return for “the fruits of greater 
investments in technological innovation.” Id. These suggestions are very much in the spirit of our discussion in Part 
IV below. 
45 See Circular A-4, supra note, at 35. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. OMB overstates the professional consensus. See Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, supra note. 
48 Cf. Richard Dubourg & David Pearce. Paradigms for Environmental Choice: Sustainability versus Optimality, in 
Models of Sustainable Development 21, 24 (Sylvie Faucheux et al. eds. 1996) (“For maximizing a single utility   9
For the Last Generation, the argument for discounting requires only one step: acceptance 
of the claim, now standard in the federal government and endorsed by many critics of 
discounting, that statistical risks should be turned into monetary equivalents. Once that claim is 
accepted, the case for a unitary discount rate, one that cuts across all relevant costs and benefits, 
follows as a matter of course. It is unnecessary to speak of opportunity costs, as OMB does, or to 
ask, as Revesz does, whether the arguments that apply to money also apply to health and life. 
The reason is that what is being discounted is always money, and never health or life as such; 
once a regulatory benefit has been translated into its monetary equivalent, regulators can deal 
with it as they would any other money. When agencies apply a discount rate to monetized 
regulatory benefits, they are discounting the relevant monetary amounts, not life or health. 
To understand this point, it is necessary to see how regulators translate reductions of risk 
to life and health into monetary amounts. The answer comes from two kinds of evidence. The 
first and most important involves real-world markets, producing evidence of compensation levels 
for actual risks.
49 In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional safety has a price; market 
evidence is investigated to identify that price.
50 The second kind of evidence comes from 
contingent valuation studies, asking people how much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical 
risks.
51 Both of these approaches are controversial, of course
52; their use grows out of the simple 
idea that people should not be forced to pay for risk protection they do not want.
53 
Currently, regulators use this evidence to calculate the amounts that people are willing to 
pay to avoid certain categories and levels of risk.
54  The most frequently used calculation 
involves the “value of a statistical life” (VSL).  Once an agency has identified the relevant 
studies, the calculation of VSL is a product of simple arithmetic.  The Environmental Protection 
Agency, for instance, relies on studies of actual workplace risk, attempting to determine how 
                                                                                                                                                             
function . . . over infinite time cannot help but suggest that we are dealing with a single generation which exists 
forever, or even a single individual”). 
49 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk (1992). 
50 A valuable and comprehensive overview can be found in W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a 
Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J Risk and Uncertainty 5 (2003). 
51 See, e.g., James Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of Mortality Risk, 
28 J Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004). 
52 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, supra note. 
53 Of course this claim would not justify current practice if the figures are based on a lack of information or bounded 
rationality. See discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 Duke LJ 385 (2004). 
54 For an overview, see id.   10
much workers are paid to assume mortality hazards.
55 If workers must be paid $600, on average, 
to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000, the value of a statistical life would be said to be $6 million.  It 
should be clear, however, that the very idea of valuing a statistical life is misleading; no one is 
“valuing life.” The real issue involves the valuation of statistical risks. It would be much more 
accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the median monetary value in the relevant population is 
$600—or that for risks of 1/100,000, the median monetary value is $60.   
Once regulatory benefits have been monetized in this way, regulators are no longer 
discounting actual risks to life or health; they are merely discounting the amounts of money that 
people are willing to pay to avoid those risks. In discounting these monetized regulatory benefits, 
regulators are doing nothing more controversial than discounting money. It is appropriate to 
discount the money that people will be willing to spend on refrigerators, automobiles, movies, 
books, education, and medicine; the same is true of the money that people are willing to spend 
on the risks that people face. To accept discounting for the Last Generation, there is no need to 
identify logical conundrums or implausible outcomes that seem to follow from a failure to 
discount. It is not necessary to embark on complex and disputed empirical studies about how 
people compare a health risk in 2020 to a health risk today. Only two steps are necessary: An 
appreciation of the theory that underlies current practice, and an understanding that what is being 
discounted, always, is money, and not life, health, or the environment as such. 
Return in this light to the question of latent harms and suppose that for the Last 
Generation, it is necessary to assign monetary values to a risk that will come to fruition in 2015. 
Suppose that ordinarily $6 million is the appropriate VSL. If the issue is the value of eliminating 
a risk of 1/100,000 in 2020, and if the answer, in 2020, is $80, that amount must be subject to the 
appropriate discount rate for money – and hence the VSL of $8 million must be discounted too. 
The reason has nothing to do with discounting risks or health; it is that an expenditure of $8 




How might this argument be resisted? It is correct to say that national wealth tends to 
increase over time, and hence people will likely be wealthier in 2020 than they now are. Because 
                                                 
55 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, supra note, for discussion.   11
they will be wealthier, they will demand more to be subject to statistical risks. For this reason, 
use of the current VSL, to produce monetary amounts in the future, likely produces unjustifiably 
low numbers.
56 But these are not points against discounting. They simply suggest that the 
numbers that must be discounted are higher than regulators currently recognize. The proper 
analysis uses a multiplier for national income growth and other relevant factors, and applies a 
discount rate from that point. 
Similarly, it might be objected that agencies are on fragile ground in using labor market 
studies to estimate VSL.
57 Perhaps workers, accepting a $60 premium to face a risk of 1/100,000, 
are insufficiently informed or are subject to some form of coercion. Perhaps the proper premium 
is $70, or $100, or $200. If so, agency practice would have to change significantly; but 
discounting itself would be unaffected. What would be discounted would be the proper monetary 
amounts rather than the improper ones. So long as any monetary valuation is used, discounting 
generally follows. To repeat: When discounting occurs, it is money that is being discounted, not 
the goods to which monetary amounts are being assigned.  
A separate objection would stress that in the future, technological, medical, and other 
changes will produce a range of improvements with respect to health, safety, and the 
environment. Harms that we now project, holding current practices constant, might well not 
materialize, simply because posterity will be in a position to prevent them. This objection is 
plausible in itself, but it is not a claim about discounting. It is true that regulators who are 
projecting future harms should attempt to make an accurate projection, and accuracy requires an 
appreciation of technological innovation. But a “probabilistic discount rate,”
58 reflecting a 
judgment about such innovation, should not be confused with the issues of discounting on which 
we are focusing here. 
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A more ambitious counterargument would suggest that the monetary values of human 
beings are not the proper basis for valuing some regulatory benefits. Consider, for example, the 
continued existence of an endangered species, or the lives of wild horses or elephants. It is 
controversial (as it should be
59) to say that endangered species and animals should be valued by 
aggregating  people’s willingness to pay to protect them. What might be sought is a more 
deliberative judgment, based on the exchange of reasons that can be offered on behalf of one or 
another outcome.
60 And perhaps the underlying concern could be generalized to a range of 
benefits and amenities. We should agree that there are many problems with the claim that all 
goods, including other living creatures, should be valued by aggregating private willingness to 
pay. But any method of valuation will necessarily include the explicit or implicit assignment of 
monetary values. So long as that assignment is made, discounting is generally appropriate, 
because no one doubts that it is appropriate to discount money.
61 
A final objection would ask some questions about the temporal distribution of the risks to 
be faced by the citizens of the Last Generation. Suppose that some citizens will face risks 
imminently, whereas others will face risks in a decade, and still others will face risks in twenty 
or even thirty years. It should be readily apparent that with discounting, imminent mortality risks 
will receive higher values than risks that will not materialize for many years, and that the same 
level and kind of risk will elicit a different regulatory expenditure, depending on when the risk 
will be faced. Is this wrong or unfair? The simplest answer assumes that each citizen pays, in 
full, for the relevant risk reduction. With that assumption, it should be clear that there is no error 
or unfairness. It is not unfair to believe that John will pay $50 to reduce an imminent risk of 
1/100,000 while also assuming that Jane—or even John himself—will pay only some fraction of 
that amount to reduce a risk of 1/100,000 in thirty years. That belief follows from the fact that 
the monetary value of the future risk can and should be discounted. But if it is not assumed that 
each citizen will pay, in full, for the relevant risk reduction, then the analysis cannot be so 
simple. When regulatory benefits are enjoyed by people who have not paid for them, risk 
regulations will have a distributional effect, and that effect should be taken into account.
62 But as 
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we shall shortly see, this is not a point about discounting as such, and it does not affect the 
analysis of discounting for the Last Generation.  
 
5. Intergenerational Equity 
 
The Basic Problem 
Our argument thus far has not explored the question of intergenerational equity. Of 
course the amounts spent by future generations involve money, and at first glance that money 
must be discounted, simply because it is money. But critics are correct to say that discounting 
might contribute to serious problems of intergenerational equity.
63 The reason is that with 
discounting, a cost-benefit analysis can lead the current generation to impose extremely high 
costs on future generations, and such costs might be imposed without providing compensating 
benefits to the losers -- leading to a net welfare loss, a serious distributional problem, or both.
64  
To be sure, people might well have a pure time preference for money, preferring one hundred 
dollars today to the financially equivalent sum in a year
65; but a pure time preference for 
individuals cannot justify a discount rate with respect to harms faced by people not yet born.
66 
It is possible, of course, that the current generation will effectively “pay off” the future 
generation, making it more than worthwhile for it to bear those costs; the problem of 
intergenerational equity would be resolved if future generations are in fact compensated because 
(for example) adequate sums of money have been invested for their eventual benefit. And the 
course of human history, with astounding improvements in wealth, health, and longevity, makes 
it plausible to suggest that something like this does happen over time.
67 But there is no assurance 
that it will continue to occur, in general or for particular risks.
68 It follows that in principle and 
all by itself, a cost-benefit analysis, based on discounting, can create genuine risks of both net 
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welfare losses and distributional inequity.
69 It is not at all clear, however, that a refusal to 
discount is the best way of reducing those risks. On the contrary, any such refusal might well 
harm members of future generations. Our submission is that if cost-benefit analysis with 
discounting imposes a serious loss on members of future generations, the current generation 
fulfills its obligations not by failing to discount, but by providing compensation for that loss.
70 
 
Methuselah, Paretoville, and Beyond 
To see the relevant considerations, consider five problems. Of these the fourth and fifth 
are most important, but they are best understood in light of those that precede them. 
 
Methuselah 
Suppose that society consists of only one person, who, it turns out, will live for a great 
many years, even centuries. Let us call him Methuselah. Suppose that Methuselah will face a set 
of health risks (by hypothesis, none of them fatal) over time. Suppose that each risk of concern – 
those that involve a significant malady -- is in the vicinity of 1/100, and that Methuselah is 
willing to pay $3000 to eliminate each of these risks. On standard assumptions, it is fully 
appropriate to discount, by the appropriate amount, the monetary value of the relevant risks. If a 
1/100 risk will be faced in 2020, it is worth not $3000, but $3000 discounted to present value. 
Methuselah can invest that discounted amount and watch it grow.
71 Money is being discounted, 
not health – a restatement of our conclusion in Part II. 
This conclusion might be rejected if Methuselah is seen as a series of selves extending 
over time and if an early self does not act as an appropriate agent for the later one.
72 It is possible 
that Methuseleh should be required to take steps to ensure against serious harms in old age, 
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especially if self-control problems loom large. But if we indulge the not implausible assumption 
that Methuseleh is a good agent for his later self, discounting is fully appropriate. 
 
Paretoville 
Suppose that everyone in a small town, Paretoville, faces a current risk of 1/100,000, and 
that every resident of Paretoville is willing to pay $50, but no more, to eliminate that risk. The 
mayor of Paretoville takes this figure very seriously, and decides not to eliminate risks of 
1/100,000 if the cost of doing so is greater than $50. Under plausible assumptions, involving 
adequate information and sufficient rationality,
73 the mayor is properly using cost-benefit 
analysis in deciding how to proceed, and there is no objection from the standpoint of equity. The 
reason is that every member of Paretoville pays, in full, for risk reduction, and people should not 
be required to pay more than they wish unless there is a problem of inadequate information, 
bounded rationality, or harms to third parties.
74 In some regulatory contexts, of course, all three 
problems are involved, and they introduce complications
75; but we are assuming that they are 
absent in Paretoville. For the citizens of Paretoville, the argument for discounting is 
straightforward. 
 
Dirtyville and Cleanville in Kaldorhicksiana 
Two towns, Dirtyville and Cleanville, are adjacent to one another in the large and 
somewhat messy state of Kaldorhicksiana. Dirtyville engages in polluting activity that produces 
$60 in benefits to each of its 100,000 citizens. That activity creates a risk of 1/100,000, faced by 
each of the 100,000 citizens of Cleanville. Each citizen of Cleanville is willing to pay $50, but no 
more, to eliminate the risk of 1/100,000 caused by Dirtyville’s polluting activity. On cost-benefit 
grounds, the polluting activity should be allowed; its value is $6 million, which is higher than its 
$5 million cost.  
But this problem is different from problem (2) because there is a distributional question: 
The citizens of Cleanville are uncompensated losers. If we were committed to economic 
efficiency, we would want the polluting activity to continue, but the distributional problem 
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complicates matters. And the problem may be worse still.  Because monetized figures rather than 
direct measurements of welfare are involved, it is possible that the activity actually creates a net 
welfare loss, with the citizens of Cleanville losing more, in welfare terms, than the citizens of 
Dirtyville gain.
76 Suppose, for instance, that the citizens of Cleanville are relatively poor, and 
hence their willingness to pay only $50 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 is consistent with the 
conclusion that they are facing a huge welfare loss from their subjection to that risk. The 
relatively small amount each citizen is willing to pay -- $50 – reflects their relative poverty, not a 
relatively small welfare loss. On plausible assumptions, the state of Kaldorhicksiana, containing 
these two towns, is not living up to its name, because the losers are not, in welfare terms, losing 
less than the winners gain. 
The welfare question could be tested, and the problem could be made analytically 
equivalent to problem (2), if the citizens of Dirtyville could be forced to compensate those of 
Cleanville, through law or some process of bargaining. But let us suppose that this is not 
feasible. In that event, we cannot be sure whether the efficient solution is also the solution that 
promotes social welfare. An additional question, a familiar one in regulatory policy, is whether 
there should be some kind of equitable or distributional barrier to be the use of cost-benefit 
balancing.
77 If the citizens of Dirtyville are wealthy, and those of Cleanville are poor, the barrier 
might well be justified, at least if there is no mechanism by which the citizens of Cleanville can 
capture some of the benefits of the activity. 
 
Presentville  and Futureville 
Presentville engages in polluting activity that produces $60 in benefits to each of its 
100,000 citizens. But the polluting activity does not harm citizens of Presentville or any other 
current place; instead it harms members of future generations. More particularly, the activity will 
impose a risk that will materialize in one hundred years, in the town of Futureville -- which, as it 
happens, is Presentville a century from now. In that time, the one million citizens of Futureville 
will face a death risk of 1/10,000 –- meaning that 100 people are expected to die. If the lives of 
the people of Futureville are valued at $8 million, it is clear that the polluting activity should 
stop, because $800 million is far greater than $6 million. But if money is discounted at an annual 
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rate of 7%, each of their lives is worth only $581, and hence the polluting activity should 
continue, because $6 million is far greater than $58,100. 
On what premises does it make sense to refuse a $6 million (current) expenditure to save 
100 future lives? If all the people of Presentville and Futureville were treated as a single person 
extending over time, then the case would be similar to case (1), and discounting would be 
appropriate. In that case, the various people would amount to just one person, Methuselah, who 
could invest the relevant sources and use them later. And it is tempting to suppose that if there 
were an intergenerational negotiation between the people of Presentville and the people of 
Futureville, discounting would be part of a mutually beneficial trade.
78 Here is the reason: The 
people of Presentville could agree not to squander or to consume the benefits they receive, but 
instead to invest a relevant sum and offer that amount to the people of Futureville, making them 
better off on balance.  Those who emphasize the opportunity costs of investments as a reason for 
discounting, including OMB, implicitly appeal to the idea that future generations will in fact 
benefit from the investments that current generations make.
79 Hence discounting might be seen 
as a part of a (hypothetical) mutually beneficial intergenerational negotiation. 
But there are two problems with relying on that idea. The first is conceptual: What is the 
set of background entitlements against which this purely hypothetical negotiation is occurring? 
At first glance, the people of Presentville are literally dictators; they can decide to consume all 
existing resources, to impoverish posterity, even to remain childless and not to create later 
generations at all. In the (hypothetical) negotiating process, are the people of Presentville 
permitted to threaten the (hypothetical) people of Futureville with nonexistence? If so, how much 
will Futureville be able to extract? And if Presentville merely threatens Futureville with 
impoverishment and desperation, the people of Futureville will be in a singularly weak position 
to extract protection against (say) individual risks of 1/100,000. In short, the idea of a mutually 
beneficial deal raises serious conceptual difficulties unless there is some specification of 
entitlements against which Presentville and Futureville might bargain. To be plausible, any such 
specification will inevitably have to depend on an independent normative account of some kind, 
                                                                                                                                                             
77 See Portney and Weyant, Introduction, supra note, at 6. 
78 See Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Decisionmaking, supra, at 176-77; Dexter Samida, Improving Lives by 
Discounting Them (unpublished draft, March 2005). 
79 See supra.   18
and that independent account, rather than a notion of intergenerational bargaining as such, will 
be doing the crucial work. 
The second problem is pragmatic. Suppose, as is plausible, that there is no mechanism to 
ensure that any mutually beneficial bargain will be enforceable; the citizens of Presentville might 
simply consume their resources instead.
80 To this extent, there is no guarantee that the citizens of 
Presentville will act in a way that benefits Futureville, and hence there is a serious risk of 
intergenerational equity—a risk that is only compounded by the use of cost-benefit analysis with 
a standard discount rate. The case is analytically similar to (3). Indeed, it is even worse: While 
case (3) presents a distributional problem and potentially a net welfare loss, the case of 
Presentville and Futureville present a distributional problem and a certain welfare loss -- at least 
without full compensation -- because 100 future deaths must count as a larger welfare loss than 
the loss of $6 million. To be sure, the problem would be solved with compensation, and the 
discounted value of the 100 future deaths should be used if Futureville will benefit from the 
investment of that value. If so, the case would be quite similar to case (2) (back to Paretoville). 




Turn now to a more realistic example, involving global warming.
82 Suppose, as is 
plausible, that the primary victims of global warming will include poor people in India and 
Africa. Suppose that the planners concerned with global warming decide what to do by engaging 
in cost-benefit analysis and discounting the victims’ costs to present value. If so, such victims 
will not be much helped, because no one is planning to invest the discounted sum to create a 
fund to compensate them in the future. To be sure, technological innovations might mean that 
what we see as likely deaths end up as mere illnesses (and perhaps minor illnesses at that). But 
this is not a justification for discounting; it is instead an effort to deny that the anticipated harms 
will be as large as we project. If the number is inflated, then of course the analysis must change.  
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It is also true that future generations are likely to be wealthier than our own, and hence it 
might not make much sense for the relatively poor present to transfer resources to the relatively 
richer future.
83 This would be a perverse form of redistribution. If future generations can be 
expected to be richer, that point must be part of the analysis of what equity requires. But 
suppose, for example, that a relatively poor community is gaining $6 million as a result of 
activity that will cause 100 deaths in a relatively wealthier community. Is the activity justified 
merely because poorer people are obtaining the benefit, which by hypothesis is much smaller 
than the cost? That claim would be exceedingly difficult to defend. It is in this light that cost-
benefit analysis with discounting can indeed produce serious problems across generations, 
including a net welfare loss and distributional unfairness. 
Responding to concerns of this sort, Thomas Schelling argues that “[g]reenhouse gas 
abatement is a foreign aid program, not a saving-investment problem of the familiar kind.”
84 For 
long-term problems, it might be thought that the question is whether the current generation 
should provide “foreign aid” to posterity. And because posterity is likely to be wealthier than we 
are,
85 there is a serious question whether such aid should be provided. As Schelling suggests, 
citizens of the developed world are not now willing to make significant sacrifices to help people 
in poor nations; it would seem extremely unlikely that such citizens would be willing to make 
significant sacrifices to assist people in those same nations in the distant and probably less-poor 
future.
86  
But Schelling’s analogy requires a great deal of care. Futureville is not merely a foreign 
country; it consists to a large extent of Presentville’s own descendents, and the risks they face are 
a direct result of Presentville’s actions. Our obligations to our descendents are plausibly different 
from our obligations to remote strangers. Whether or not this is the case, the idea of “foreign aid” 
does not fit problems like that of global warming, in which environmental and health risks in 
some Futureville are a product of actions undertaken knowingly (and perhaps negligently) by 
some Presentville. In that event, the present might well be seen to have committed a kind of tort, 
and the claim for compensation is hardly a claim for some kind of subsidy, or “aid.” To give a 
stark example, imagine that present generations plant a bomb that will explode in two centuries. 
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Is this a violation of the obligation to provide “foreign aid”? Environmental problems are rarely 
bombs, for they are not created with malice or with destructive goals; but if they result from 
activities that are projected to create risks, they must be analyzed in the general terms of tort law. 
This point has important implications for global warming, for the risks, faced above all by poor 
nations, are a result of actions from which wealthier nations have benefited. 
 
Not Discounting as a Crude Response to the Intergenerational Problem 
 
Theory 
The lesson of the discussion thus far is that future generations might well have a 
legitimate complaint if current generations follow the path indicated by cost-benefit analysis with 
discounting, and do nothing to compensate future generations for the harms they incur as a 
result. Of course there is a great deal of dispute about the ethical obligations owed by the present 
to the future.
87 John Rawls, for example, emphasizes a “just savings” principle, to be chosen by 
people behind a veil of ignorance in which “they do not know to which generation they belong 
or, what comes to the same thing, the stage of civilization of their society.”
88 What is required, 
on this view, is a system of savings that will bring “about the full realization of just institutions 
and the equal liberties,”
89 with attention to the “standpoint of the least advantaged of each 
generation.”
90 Under this approach, cost-benefit analysis with discounting is morally problematic 
if it leads to decisions that (for example) greatly injure the most disadvantaged members of 
future societies. 
In a later treatment, Rawls suggests that is unhelpful to “imagine a (hypothetical and 
nonhistorical) direct agreement between all generations.”
91 Instead the parties, behind the veil of 
ignorance, might be “required to agree to a savings principle subject to the further condition that 
they must want all previous generations to have followed it.”
92 This savings principle has the 
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advantage of treating all generations the same, thus protecting against the dual problems of 
impoverishing the present and impoverishing the future. An approach that harmed the most 
disadvantaged members of current generations, for the sake of the future, would therefore be 
disfavored; and so too with an approach from which current generations benefit at the expense of 
the most disadvantaged members of posterity (as, on one view, is the case of emissions of 
greenhouse gases
93). 
From a welfarist point of view, the goal should be to maximize welfare over time.  From 
that point of view, the current generation violates its ethical responsibilities if it engages in 
projects that lead to net welfare losses, measured after including the interests of all generations. 
Welfarists would want current generations to give members of future generations the same moral 
weight that they give to existing people. For present purposes we want to bracket the most 
controversial questions, and simply suggest that any ethical obligations are satisfied if the 
present can make it worthwhile for future generations to run the risk or risks to which it subjects 
them. This suggestion is in the same family as Rawls’ claims about the uses of the veil of 
ignorance; it also fits with what welfarists would require.  
Note that we are arguing that a full compensation principle satisfies any moral 
obligations; we are not arguing that those obligations necessarily require that principle. Rawls’ 
just savings principle, for example, would be satisfied by less than full compensation,
94 and it is 
possible to imagine situations in which full compensation might well be too demanding. 
Suppose, for example, that the result of full compensation would be to impoverish the most 
disadvantaged members of the current generation, in order to ensure compensation to the 
already-wealthy members of future generations. Current generations might, in principle, be able 
to claim that full compensation is not necessary when the distributive consequences are perverse. 
The only claims here are that the debate over intergenerational equity should be separated from 
the debate over discounting, and that if current generations do provide full compensation, they 
are fulfilling any moral obligations that they have.  
To be sure, there are exceedingly hard questions in the background about appropriate 
aggregation. Must the present compensate the future for each particular risk? That conclusion 
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would be implausible; surely it would be acceptable to impose a risk of 1/100,000 on ten million 
future people if the very step that imposes that risk also eliminates a 1/10,000 risk that would be 
faced by one hundred million future people (including the ten million future people subjected to 
a new 1/100,000 risk). At first glance, then, the goal should be to produce an overall “risk 
package” for which adequate compensation has been paid. But to what, exactly, is this overall 
risk package being compared? To a situation in which future generations face extreme poverty 
and catastrophic global warming? To a situation in which future generations do not exist at all? 
These questions are closely connected with the difficulty of specifying the background 
entitlements against which any hypothetical bargaining occurs. We shall continue to bracket the 
most difficult questions and operate here on the assumption that whatever the moral obligations 
of the present generation, they are certainly satisfied if, for each risk that is imposed as a result of 
cost-benefit analysis with discounting, full compensation is paid to the risk-bearer at the time the 
risk is borne.  
 
Discounting and compensation 
Suppose that the present generation accepts this account of its responsibilities and wants 
to make it worthwhile for posterity to face a risk. The key point – what we seek to emphasize 
here -- is that refusing to discount is not the most efficient way of accomplishing that goal.
95 
Indeed, any such refusal might well hurt posterity. If the present generation wants to compensate 
the future for risks, the better course is to engage in cost-benefit analysis using the standard 
discount rate, to proceed as that analysis suggests, and then to transfer relevant amounts to future 
citizens to compensate them for incurring the relevant risks. If (as we believe) it is plausible to 
think that the current generation is obliged not to impose serious harms on posterity, the moral 
obligation is best discharged not by a zero discount rate, but by asking the current generation to 
compensate the future for the risks that it imposes on them.  
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A refusal to discount, often justified as a way of assisting the future,
96 is a singularly 
crude way of attempting to fulfill that obligation. If the refusal to discount results in the 
postponement of protective programs, environmental and otherwise, the future is likely to be hurt 
rather than helped.
97 If the consequence of discounting is to reduce investments, economic and 
otherwise, that will lead to long-term prosperity, then discounting is hardly helpful to future 
generations, which benefit from economic growth. The moral obligations of current generations 
should be uncoupled from the question of discounting, because neither discounting nor refusing 
to discount is an effective way of ensuring that those obligations are fulfilled. 
A simple conclusion follows from this analysis. We have shown that cost-benefit analysis 
with discounting can produce serious distributional problems, and can easily lead to a net welfare 
loss. The proper response to this problem is to continue to engage in cost-benefit analysis with 
discounting, while taking one additional step: ensuring that sufficient amounts are invested for 
the benefit of posterity so that it is adequately compensated  for the risks the present generation 
imposes on it. Unfortunately, this view is much easier to announce than to implement.
98 On an 
optimistic view, no special steps are necessary. Some combination of market forces and ordinary 
altruism tends to ensure that the risks faced by any particular generation are more than 
compensated; past history suggests that those who come later are, in most relevant respects, 
significantly better off than those who came before.
99  
But perhaps the optimistic view is unrealistic for some problems, such as global 
warming. Suppose that global warming imposes truly catastrophic losses for the world as a 
whole.
100 If so, the benefits that come from current investments are unlikely to provide adequate 
compensation. And even if the losses from global warming are not catastrophic, it would be 
surprising if the gains from refusing to spend money on greenhouse gas emissions will turn out 
to work to protect those who are most likely to suffer from greenhouse gas emissions.  
When the optimistic view fails, a morally adequate response is for current generations to 
take self-conscious steps to ensure that any losers are compensated for their losses.
101 Our goal is 
not to specify the mechanisms by which current generations fulfill that obligation, but to suggest 
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that whether or not the optimistic view is right, a refusal to discount is not the appropriate 
response to the risk of intergenerational inequity. The supplemental point – what we are 
emphasizing here -- is that when cost-benefit analysis with discounting threatens to harm part or 
all of posterity, the present generation fulfills all of its moral obligations by creating buffers in 
the form of resources that will provide adequate compensation.
102 
 
A Note on Sustainable Development 
  In recent years, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the topic of “sustainable 
development,” an idea that has considerable force in international law.
103 Unfortunately, the idea 
of sustainability remains poorly defined. An influential report suggests that development is 
sustainable if it “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”
104 Robert Solow defines sustainability to require each 
generation to have the capacity to attain the same levels of welfare as those that preceded it.
105 
For the environmental context, this definition means that nonrenewable resources must be used 
so as not to make it impossible for future generations to acquire the same standard of living.
106 
Edith Brown Weiss argues that each generation has a duty not to make the environmental quality 
of the planet worse and also to preserve the essential options available to future generations.
107 
  If the idea of sustainable development is designed to require present generations to pay 
attention to the interests of those who will follow, it is unobjectionable, and for the reasons set 
out thus far, it is exceedingly important. Of course most people are willing to sacrifice their own 
well-being for the benefit of their children, and as we have emphasized, the arc of human history 
suggests that for most nations, “sustainable development” will occur whether or not citizens put 
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their minds to it. But for some goods, including some environmental amenities, long-term losses 
are possible unless steps are taken to avoid them; and global warming threatens to impose large-
scale risks on posterity.
108 The idea of sustainable development can be seen as a reminder of the 
moral obligations of the present. So seen, however, the idea adds little to the existing debate on 
intergenerational equity and welfare; it simply offers an easily remembered slogan, capturing the 
claim that relevant obligations do in fact exist.  
To the extent that the idea of sustainable development is meant to require a specific 
policy of preserving environmental goods, it offers a valuable reminder that current actions can 
produce short-run economic benefits while also creating long-term environmental problems.  The 
reminder is especially important in the face of potentially irreversible environmental change.
109  
But environmental protection can burden the future too, especially if it is extremely costly, and 
there is no abstract reason to believe that preserving a particular environmental amenity (a forest, 
a lake) is always better for posterity than other investments that do not involve the environment 
in particular (expenditures on basic research, reductions in national debt). The appropriate 
conclusion is that an emphasis on sustainable development should be seen as a reminder of moral 
obligations to future generations. The basic idea must be taken as a placeholder for a set of 




  What are the implications for reviewing courts and for regulatory practice? The question 
of judicial review is the easiest to handle. Courts are correct to require some kind of rationale for 
any particular discount rate (including a discount rate of zero).
110 An implausibly high discount 
rate (say, 10%) would have to be explained, as would an implausibly low one (1%). But the great 
complexity of the underlying issues, and the continued existence of reasonable disagreement, 
argue for a cautious judicial role, especially because of the risk that judicial invalidations will 
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simply stall desirable regulation.
111 Of course extreme cases can be imagined.
112 Suppose that an 
agency refuses to discount the monetary value of health and safety benefits and that future 
generations are not involved. If so, it would be reasonable to rule that the agency’s refusal is 
arbitrary, and perhaps any resulting regulation should be struck down if the refusal to discount is 
responsible for its content. But across a wide range of agency choices, judicial deference is the 
best general orientation. 
  Our discussion provides considerable support for OMB’s general posture of requiring the 
same discount rate for all costs and benefits.
113 It does so not on OMB’s unruly and complex 
rationale,
114 but on the ground that for latent harms, what is being discounted is money, and not 
risks to life and health as such. To the extent that regulations will mostly affect currently living 
people, a uniform discount rate is fully appropriate. Unfortunately, agencies have not always 
followed OMB’s guidance with respect to discount rates.
115 On this issue, at least, they ought to 
so do.  
The analysis must be more complicated when planners are affecting the welfare of future 
generations -- as, for example, in the assessments of values associated with protection against 
global warming. It is standard to use a uniform discount rate for such values.
116 Nothing said 
here suggests that the standard practice is wrong. But we have emphasized that for such 
problems as global warming, cost-benefit analysis with the usual discount rate can produce both 
welfare losses and serious unfairness.
117 In this context, social planners should not base their 
decisions solely on such analysis with discounting; any judgments about appropriate regulation 
must be accompanied by steps to compensate posterity for the risks that it will face. For global 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The debate over discounting regulatory benefits has become both vigorous and 
exceedingly complicated. In our view, both advocates and critics of discounting have missed a 
central point. So long as monetary values are assigned to the relevant variables, it is only money, 
and not any variable, that is being discounted. If a discount rate is properly applied to money, it 
is properly applied to the money that public or private actors are willing to devote to regulatory 
benefits. There is no need for a separate assessment of the discount rate applied to “latent 
harms.” What is being discounted is the money that is used to combat those harms.  
In many respects, current valuations may be too low – perhaps because they do not 
consider national income growth, perhaps because cancer risks deserve particular attention,
118 
perhaps because they do not include the valuations of those whose friends and family members 
are at risk.
119 But as a general rule, it should not be controversial to apply the monetary discount 
rate to monetized regulatory benefits, simply because no one doubts that money should be 
discounted. 
It is true that as applied across generations, cost-benefit analysis with discounting can 
produce a net welfare loss, significant equitable difficulties, or both. For this reason, decisions 
based on that form of analysis can create severe ethical problems. But a refusal to discount might 
well fail to solve those problems. It may even aggravate them, either by impoverishing the 
present (to the detriment of the future) or by requiring the delay of life-saving programs (also to 
the detriment of the future). The better practice is to continue with both cost-benefit analysis and 
standard discounting, while ensuring that posterity is compensated directly for the risks imposed 
on it by the present. This principle presents substantial practical problems and some conceptual 
ones as well, but it provides the proper general orientation for both theory and practice. 
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